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METAPHOR AND ANALOGY: THE SUN AND 
MOON OF LEGAL PERSUASION 
 
Linda L. Berger 
 
If we insist upon confining ourselves to 
scrupulously rational modes of thought and 
discussion, . . . this may well have the effect of 
granting inappropriate influence to pre-existing 
biases . . . . Against this, harnessing the power of 
imagination to reconfigure our thoughts by more 
intuitive means may enable us to counteract these 




Metaphor and analogy are the sun and moon of legal 
persuasion. But which is the sun and which is the moon? Metaphor 
is the sun, according to linguist George Lakoff and philosopher 
Mark Johnson, because all human thought and expression revolve 
around it.2 Analogy researcher Doug Hofstadter would counter that 
                                                          
* Linda L. Berger is Family Foundation Professor of Law, William S. Boyd 
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Kathy Stanchi, 
Sara Gordon, Terry Pollman, and the organizers of and other participants in the 
Brooklyn Symposium on Cognitive Bias and Persuasion. 
1 Elisabeth Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination: Metaphor, 
Fiction, and Thought Experiments, in 33 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 107, 
128 (Peter A. French ed., 2009) [hereinafter Camp, Two Varieties of Literary 
Imagination].  
2 See, e.g., MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF 
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, The 
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 202 (Andrew 
Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS 
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE 
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) [hereinafter 
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS]; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
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analogy is like the sun because analogy fills the sky of human 
cognition.3 And when Romeo proclaims that Juliet is the sun, 
Romeo is asking us to view Juliet through a perspective that 
reflects light on certain of her features and not others: “her beauty, 
her uniqueness, and the warmth with which she fills his heart.”4  
For those interested in legal persuasion, metaphor and analogy 
constitute both sun and moon. Providing comparison, 
categorization, and perspective, they are our primary sources of 
generated and reflected light. Put another way, because metaphor 
and analogy are the primary ways in which we are able to see one 
thing “as” another, they are the primary ways in which we 
understand new information (here’s a comparable example); 
determine where something new likely fits (that looks like the right 
slot); or suggest a different point of view (now I see what you 
mean).  
According to recent cognitive research into the processing of 
analogy and metaphor, the important distinction is not between 
metaphor and analogy but rather between novel and conventional 
metaphors.5 This research suggests that novel characterizations and 
                                                          
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO 
WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN 
THE FLESH]; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND 
MIND (2001).  
3 Although he does not actually claim that analogy is like the sun, 
Hofstadter uses a related metaphor: “[A]nalogy is anything but a bitty blip [in 
the broad blue sky of cognition]—rather, it’s the very blue that fills the whole 
sky of cognition—analogy is everything, or very nearly so, in my view.” 
Douglas R. Hofstadter, Epilogue: Analogy as the Core of Cognition, in THE 
ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 499, 499 (Dedre 
Gentner et al. eds., 2001).  
4 Elisabeth Camp, Showing, Telling and Seeing: Metaphor and “Poetic” 
Language, 3 BALTIC INT’L Y.B. COGNITION, LOGIC & COMM., Aug. 2008, at 1, 2 
[hereinafter Camp, Showing, Telling, and Seeing]. The metaphor from WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, has been explained in different 
ways. See Dan Hunter, Teaching and Using Analogy in Law, 2 J. ALWD 151, 
155 (2004) (describing it as an explicit similarity likening Juliet to the “light of 
his world”); Dedre Gentner, Structure-Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for 
Analogy, 7 COGNITIVE SCI. 155, 162 (1983) [hereinafter Gentner, Structure-
Mapping] (describing it as chiefly conveying spatial and emotional relationships 
rather than similar features: Juliet appears above him and brings him hope). 
5 Although there are obvious connections, the analogy research described 
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metaphors spark an analogy-like comparison and the resulting 
process of comparison may in turn generate new understanding.6 
This new understanding emerges not because new information has 
been provided to the reader, but instead because the reader is able 
to perceive and interpret the available information in a new way. 
The shift is not in what we see (content) but in how we see 
(perspective).7 
The analysis and suggestions that follow rely on two key 
findings from cognitive researchers: (1) metaphors follow a career 
path as they evolve from being new to becoming conventional, and 
(2) novel metaphors tend to be more capable of generating 
knowledge while conventional metaphors tend to provide 
categories into which new information is unthinkingly slotted.8 
Novel metaphors and characterizations9 are not necessarily “novel” 
in the sense of being unique or unusual.10 Instead, they are novel 
because they have not previously been used within a specific 
context or as a basis for comparison to a particular target. For 
example, although property rights are often described as a bundle 
of sticks, it might be considered novel to describe privacy rights in 
that way.11 But if this novel metaphor were advanced, and if  the 
                                                          
here is based on the broader category of analogy rather than the familiar legal 
arguments based on analogizing to or distinguishing from a precedential case. 
6 Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL 
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 227–36 (Dedre Gentner et 
al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy] (discussing 
results indicating that processing varies as a metaphor moves along a continuum 
from novel to conventional). 
7 Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination, supra note 1, at 111. 
8 Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 227–32. 
9 For the purposes of the analogy research, characterizations are a subset of 
metaphor. 
10 For example, one of the novel metaphors used by Dedre Gentner et al. 
was “A Mind is a Kitchen.” Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra 
note 6, at 231. In a study of the neurological responses to novel metaphors, the 
examples of novel metaphors were more unusual: His handshake was a mumble; 
the insults hopped on her tongue. Eileen R. Cardillo et al., From Novel to 
Familiar: Tuning the Brain for Metaphors, 59 NEUROIMAGE 3212, 3214, 3219–
20 (2012) (reporting results from study of the neural career of metaphors). 
11 See, e.g., Michael J. Minerva Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental 
Privacy Right to Raise Their Bundle of Joy, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533 (1991). 
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reader had a stake in what was being argued, the reader would try 
to align surface features and underlying relationships found in the 
source (a bundle of sticks) with those found in the target (privacy 
rights). If the matching of surface features and underlying 
relationships seemed to be working (how might privacy rights be 
seen as divided over time and among interests and parties?), the 
reader would go on to transfer information by inference from the 
concept of a bundle of sticks to the concept of privacy rights, thus 
generating a new perspective on privacy rights.12 
Transferred to legal persuasion, these findings support a 
persuasive method intuitively recognized by lawyers: by shifting 
the way decision makers perceive and interpret situations involving 
people and events, novel characterizations and metaphors are 
sometimes able to compete with entrenched stereotypes and 
conventional categories. Moreover, the same research may provide 
guidance for lawyers working to craft the right kinds of 
characterizations and metaphors to meet specific goals. 
Drawing on research into social cognition, decision making, 
and analogy, this Article will recommend that lawyers turn to 
novel characterizations and metaphors to solve one of the difficult 
persuasion problems created by the way judges and juries think 
and decide. According to social cognition researchers, we perceive 
and interpret new information by following a process of schematic 
cognition, analogizing the new data we encounter to the schemas 
and knowledge structures embedded in our memories. Decision-
making researchers differentiate between intuitive and reflective 
thinking (System 1 and System 2), and they agree that in System 1 
decision making, only the most accessible schemas and knowledge 
structures are active and available for filtering and framing what 
we see. So when we are engaged in System 1 decision making, the 
answer to how to think about new information arrives 
automatically and intuitively, without deliberation or reflection. 
Should the answer be an unhelpful one, recent analogy research 
suggests that novel metaphors and characterizations may be used 
to prompt alternative schemas or knowledge structures beyond 
those that are immediately accessible. If initial matches can be 
made between the novel metaphor or characterization and the new 
                                                          
12 See Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 243. 
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information being perceived, the resulting online processing of 
further similarities resembles the more reflective decision making 
of System 2, a desirable persuasive result when the immediately 
accessible schemas yield an unfavorable answer. 
To provide necessary background information before 
introducing the more recent findings of analogy researchers, Part I 
of this Article will describe the connections between several 
strands of cognitive and decision-making research. The research on 
schematic cognition13 informs us of the role of embedded 
knowledge structures in our unconscious thinking, while research 
on intuitive and reflective thinking (System 1 and System 2) shows 
us how schematic cognition affects decision making.14 Part II 
explores the recent research into the processing of analogy and 
metaphor.15 Part III will bring together the findings of all three 
bodies of cognitive research to suggest and explore possible 
applications to legal persuasion.16 
 
I. OUR ABILITY AND PROPENSITY TO RECOGNIZE PATTERNS LINK 
OUR THINKING AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
The same cognitive process that leads to stereotypical thinking 
is in play when we identify imaginative solutions to problems. 
What we call cognitive bias is the result of our automatic and 
intuitive recognition of a familiar pattern.17 Because we are 
                                                          
13 See infra Part I.A. The terms used and concepts summarized in Part I.A 
derive primarily from Hofstadter, supra note 3; Anders Kaye, Schematic 
Psychology and Criminal Responsibility, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 565 (2009); 
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004). 
14 See infra Part I.B, which relies on Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the 
Judicial Hunch, 10 LEG. COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 1 (2013). 
15 See infra Part II, which relies on Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like 
Analogy, supra note 6. 
16 See infra Part III.  
17 Implicit or cognitive bias has been the subject of much research and legal 
scholarship. See generally B. Keith Payne & Bertram Gawronski, A History of 
Implicit Social Cognition: Where Is It Coming From? Where Is It Now? Where 
Is It Going?, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT, 
THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith Payne eds., 
2010); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. 
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deluged with so much data and information, our brain uses a 
triage-like approach18 to sort through perceptions and impressions. 
We settle on what we recognize as the most relevant features that 
fit into the most immediately accessible schema, filtering out other 
potentially relevant information. Triage is efficient, but it means 
that we “miss” things, and that in some sense, our “intuition” has 
closed our minds. When we use this recognition to make a snap 
judgment about people, places, things, and the future, the intuition 
that guides us may be detrimental to our better judgment. 
Moreover, simply providing more information seldom is sufficient 
to overcome the cognitive filters that fall into place once we 
intuitively recognize a familiar pattern or path.19 
What the critics of intuition sometimes miss20 is that intuition 
also opens our minds. When there is a question about how to 
resolve a difficult problem or achieve a complex goal, our intuitive 
                                                          
L. REV. 969, 972 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1489 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186–1217 (1995); Justin D. Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 347 (2007); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva la 
Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 415, 417–18 (2000). Recent articles have addressed the extent to 
which bias affects judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit 
Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417 (2011) (recommending 
reforms to help reduce the potential for implicit bias to affect decisionmaking by 
immigration judges); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias 
Affect Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009).  
18 Kaye, supra note 13, at 600.  
19 See Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1228 (concluding that “attempts to 
debias our schema-based thinking will be less successful than we would hope 
and might expect”). 
20 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–43 (2007) (suggesting an “intuition-override” 
model of judging in which judges usually make intuitive decisions that only 
sometimes are overridden by deliberation). But see Daniel Kahneman & Gary 
Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 515, 525 (2009) (“[A] psychology of judgment and decisionmaking 
that ignores intuitive skill is seriously blinkered.”). Balancing this statement, the 
authors also conclude that “a psychology of professional judgment that neglects 
predictable errors [of intuition] cannot be adequate.” Id. 
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recognition of potentially helpful patterns and paths can bring to 
mind a range of alternatives. If novel characterizations and 
metaphors are used to prompt intuitive recognition of such 
alternatives, they may be able to counter entrenched stereotypes 
and conventional categories. Rather than changing what the 
audience sees by adding information, these novel characterizations 
and metaphors work by affecting how the audience perceives and 
interprets the existing situation.  
To be able to make conscious and deliberate choices about 
persuasion, lawyers need to know something about thinking and 
decision making.21 This part briefly summarizes the current 
conventional wisdom about cognition (how we perceive, interpret, 
and organize information) and quickly explores two important 
schools of thought about decision making, a process obviously 




                                                          
21 “Intuitive problem solving” is the term I will use for what the researchers 
refer to as the naturalistic decisionmaking approach or the recognition-primed 
decision model. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE 
DECISIONS 4–6, 15–30 (1998). 
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A. Perception and Interpretation Rely on “Chunking” Data 
into Schemas and Other Embedded Knowledge Structures22 
 
Research into the cognitive process indicates that we prefer 
coherent and plausible accounts of things and that in order to get 
them, we will erase inconsistencies as well as fill in the blanks.23 
                                                          
22 The term “schematic cognition” is adopted from Kaye, supra note 13, at 
570. Kaye describes schematic cognition as the process that “reduces the unruly, 
constant flood of information available to our senses to schemas and other 
related knowledge structures—structured networks of abstract concepts, which 
can be stored in long-term memory and referenced to identify and understand 
the stimuli in our environment.” Id. For his description of the research relating 
to the role of knowledge structures in cognition, Kaye relies on SUSAN T. FISKE 
& SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL 
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999); DOUGLAS L. MEDIN ET AL., 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (4th ed. 2005); and GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL 
COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS (2005). Kaye, supra note 13, at 
568 n.2.   
 In this article, I use the phrase “embedded knowledge structures” to refer to 
the whole range of structures that are used for perception and interpretation. 
Chen and Hanson differentiate the process of categorization—the classification 
of elements, experiences, instances, or arguments into groups—from the 
application of schema to the categorized items to draw inferences and make 
predictions. Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1132–33. They use the term 
“knowledge structures” interchangeably with “schema,” and they categorize 
schemas as including self schemas, person schemas, role schemas, event 
schemas or scripts. Id. Kaye uses the term knowledge structures to include 
categories and frameworks for objects, groups of people, roles or characters, 
events, and relationships. Kaye, supra note 13, at 570.  
 In previous articles, I have used the term “embedded knowledge structures” 
to refer broadly to the cognitive frameworks constructed by our experiences in 
particular contexts. See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures 
Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative 
and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259 
(2009).  
23 The impact that schematic cognition can have on juror decision making 
is explored in Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in 
the Application of “Plain Language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643 
(2013) (assessing the influence of schemas on jury decision making and 
recommending alternatives to mitigate the negative effects).  
 Other authors have noted that Karl Llewellyn reached similar conclusions 
before cognitive science and social psychology provided research results to 
support them. Llewellyn wrote:  
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Starting very early in our lives, we encounter seemingly infinite 
amounts and kinds of sensory information. There is so much 
information, and it is so various, that we cannot discretely 
perceive, interpret, organize, and understand every single item as a 
single item. In order to efficiently filter and sort, our brains 
develop a series of scans and frames.24  
This approach allows us to “get a handle on” the information 
we perceive, first by creating frameworks and second by 
channeling new information into them.25 We create abstract 
structures or frameworks for seemingly related items, and by 
analogy, we try to fit new information into the discrete and 
                                                          
Like rules, concepts are not to be eliminated . . . . The sense 
impressions which make up what we call observation are 
useless unless gathered into some arrangement. Nor can 
thought go on without categories.  
Moreover, Llewellyn noted that the “realistic approach rests on the observation 
that categories and concepts, once formulated and once they have entered into 
thought processes, tend to take on an appearance of solidity, reality and inherent 
value which has no foundation in experience.” Once such categories and 
concepts have entered into our thinking, they appear “both to suggest the 
presence of corresponding data when these data are not in fact present, and to 
twist any fresh observation of data into conformity with the terms of the 
categories.” Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1252–53 (quoting Karl N. 
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The New Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
453 (1930)). 
24 Kaye, supra note 13, at 572–73. 
25 Chen and Hanson describe the flow as  
beginning with the search for, or acquisition of, new 
information based on individuals’ attention. After focusing on 
particular pieces of information, individuals then categorize 
the information. Once it has been attended to and categorized, 
they can then apply a schema to the information, enabling 
them to draw inferences and store the information and related 
inferences in short- and long-term memory. 
Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1140. For the overall influence of schemas on 
information processing, they rely on Hazel Markus and Robert Zajonc, 
“[I]nformation processing may be seen as consisting of schema formation or 
activation, of the integration of input with these schemas, and of the updating or 
revision of these schemas to accommodate new input.” Hazel Markus & R.B. 
Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 150 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d 
ed. 1985).  
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recognizable slots we have created. When we are successful, we 
know how to think and feel about the information without 
examining it in detail.26 This lifelong process of “chunking” is an 
efficient way to acquire, organize, and use information.27 
Researchers say it affects not only our perceptions and 
interpretations of what is going on in the world, but also our 
emotions, motivations, and decisions.28  
The frameworks that human beings create over time depend in 
part on their historical and cultural context but also on individual 
factors and experiences. Sometimes labeled heuristics, or mental 
shortcuts, these frameworks include categories, stereotypes, 
metaphors, analogies, scripts, stories, myths, and a range of other 
schemas. By a process of comparison, we first chunk things 
together and create the frameworks. Again by comparison, we 
channel the new data and information we perceive into these 
frameworks. The “triggering of prior mental categories by some 
kind of input . . . is . . . an act of analogy-making.”29 This 
channeling is considered analogical rather than mechanical 
because there is usually some degree of mismatch or “slippage” 
between the new instance and the prior category.30 Sometimes, the 
channeling works the way we usually think about categorization: 
we have a prototype in mind, and we fit new items into that slot 
                                                          
26 Hofstadter, supra note 3, at 500. Hofstadter concludes by claiming that 
thinking “is a series of leaps involving high-level perception, activation of 
concepts in long-term memory, transfer to short-term memory, partial and 
context-dependent unpacking of chunks, and then further high-level perception . 
. . .” The mechanisms “depend on the transfer of tightly packed mental chunks 
from the dormant area of long-term memory into the active area of short-term 
memory, and on their being unpacked on arrival, and then scrutinized.” Id. at 
536.  
27 Hofstadter calls cognition a “relentless lifelong process of chunking—
taking small concepts and putting them together into larger and larger ones.” Id. 
at 500. 
28 Kaye, supra note 13, at 582–88. 
29 Hofstadter, supra note 3, at 503. He describes this analogy-making 
metaphorically, “[I]t is the mental mapping onto each other of two entities—one 
old and sound asleep in the recesses of long-term memory, the other new and 
gaily dancing on the mind’s center stage—that in fact differ from each other in a 
myriad of ways.” Id. at 504. 
30 Id. at 503–04. 
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depending on how similar they are to the prototype. Sometimes, 
the channeling appears more “metaphorical”: once we assign 
something to a slot, it takes on new meaning that it did not have 
before and its fit improves.31  
Because channeling itself creates new concepts and networks, 
schematic cognition is recursive and continuous. For example, 
based on past experience, a “category” is created in the mind. 
When we encounter a new piece of information, we sift through 
our storehouse of categorical knowledge to identify it, comparing 
its features to those associated with our existing categories. We 
match the new piece with an existing category of items having 
similar features and infer that the existing category is where it 
belongs. As the category becomes full of various but similar items, 
the category itself may have to expand or evolve. 
 This process is cognitively efficient. Not only does it reduce 
our mental processing burden, it adds information without 
additional mental toil. Once new information is fit into a category, 
the information acquires the features associated with the category, 
so we know how to think about the information and what to do 
with it. Because schematic cognition usually operates 
automatically, without conscious thought or difficult analysis, the 
process is considered to be “intuitive.” Schematic frameworks or 
embedded knowledge structures lie around in our long-term 
memory until something triggers their retrieval. A prompt or a cue, 
also known as a prime or a stimulus, activates one or more of the 
embedded knowledge structures, either temporarily or more 
permanently. Which schemas or categories will be accessed 
depends on a number of factors, including how recently they have 
been used, how prominent or novel a particular feature appears to 
be, and which emotions and motives are associated with the 
choice.32 Once information has been tentatively classified, the 
                                                          
31 See MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE 
AND PHILOSOPHY 39–45 (1962). 
32 How readily the particular knowledge structure is activated depends on a 
number of factors. These include “primacy,” the effect created by the order of 
presentation of information (what comes first in a list or a request); “salience,” 
the effect created by prominence or novelty (who is the only male in the group); 
“priming,” the effect that results from recency or frequency of past reliance 
(reading about a related concept just before encountering the new information); 
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processor usually will apply the most accessible schema to it. 
Similarly, we are likely to fit ambiguous phenomena into 
chronically accessible categories, even at the expense of other less 
accessible but more fitting categories.33 If there is a slight 
mismatch, the processor may adjust either the information or the 
schema to make it fit. The processor may also search through less 
accessible schema for a better match. “Only if no such schema 
exists will [the processor] invest the cognitive energies required to 
create new schemas.”34  
Once primed, accessible knowledge structures serve as “scans” 
or “filters” for perception and “frames” or “lenses” for 
interpretation.35 An accessible schema provides a “scanning 
pattern,” which leaves us “ready to detect and perceive certain 
stimuli” at the expense of others.36 Schemas are associated with the 
“confirmation bias:” we are more likely to notice information that 
matches the activated schemas or knowledge structures.37 And 
once activated, knowledge structures affect how we interpret what 
we see. In this way, the schema becomes the person’s “interpretive 
frame.”38  
  
B. Our Ability to Recognize Familiar “Chunks” of 
Information (or Patterns) is at the Core of Both Intuitive 
and Reflective Decision Making 
 
Our intuitive and automatic ability to recognize familiar 
patterns links schematic cognition to the decision-making research. 
Although this Article will discuss two schools of decision making, 
both agree on a definition of intuition that grew out of early studies 
                                                          
and “affect” and “motivation,” the association of emotions and motives. See 
Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1174–1218.  
 For an application of priming effects to legal persuasion, see Kathryn M. 
Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First 
Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 82 OR. L. REV. 305, 332–45 (2010). 
33 See Kaye, supra note 13, at 580–81.  
34 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1174–75. 
35 See Kaye, supra note 13, at 576–86. 
36 Id. at 579 (citation omitted). 
37 Id. at 579–80.  
38 Id. at 582–86. 
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of chess masters:  
The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given 
the expert access to information stored in memory, 
and the information provides the answer. Intuition is 
nothing more and nothing less than recognition [of a 
parallel pattern or path stored in memory].39 
The patterns or paths stored in memory are the schemas or 
embedded knowledge structures on which schematic cognition 
relies. As the schematic cognition research indicates, intuitive 
judgments or choices “come to mind on their own, without explicit 
awareness of the evoking cues and . . . without an explicit 
evaluation of the validity of these cues.”40 As a result, intuitive 
judgments appear to be “automatic, arise effortlessly, and often 
come to mind without immediate justification.”41  
Although they are not dichotomous, there are two distinct 
schools of thought about the effects of schematic cognition on 
decision making. The first school of thought views intuition—in 
this same sense of pattern recognition—as more often leading to 
mistakes and overconfidence, while the second school views 
intuition as essential to recognizing alternatives for solving a 
problem. Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist who won the Nobel 
Prize in economics in 2002, is the best-known representative of the 
first school, the heuristics and biases branch of research. He and 
his long-time partner, Amos Tversky, conducted the first study in 
this field in 1969.42 Since 1985, Gary Klein, an experimental 
psychologist, has studied and written about the second school, the 
field of naturalistic decision making, examining how intuition 
triggers good decision making in situations such as firefighting, 
nursing, and military leadership.43 In a September 2009 article, 
                                                          
39 Herbert A. Simon, What is an “Explanation” of Behavior, 3 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 149, 155 (1992). 
40 Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 519. 
41 Id.  
42 The original study is included in an appendix in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). Kahneman’s book focusing on the “biases 
of intuition” was a bestseller only a few years after MALCOLM GLADWELL, 
BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005) (focusing on the 
wonders of intuition). 
43 See KLEIN, supra note 21, at 1–2; see also GARY KLEIN, STREETLIGHTS 
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Kahneman and Klein reported that after several years of 
collaboration, they had reached agreement on the circumstances 
that would allow intuition to yield good decision making.44 Still, 
their perspectives are very different: heuristics and biases 
research45 concentrates on the “overconfident and biased 
impressions” that grow out of intuition; Klein’s naturalistic 
decision-making research focuses on the expertise that may lead to 
“true intuitive skill.”46  
As a convenient way of describing a continuum of processes 
that we draw upon as cognitive demands change, heuristics and 
biases researchers divide our thinking and reasoning processes into 
intuitive and analytical categories: System 1 (thinking “fast” or 
intuitively) and System 2 (thinking “slow” or analytically). System 
1 “is rapid, intuitive, emotional, and prone to bias,” while System 2 
“is more deliberate, more reflective, more dispassionate, and (it is 
said) more accurate.”47 Although the so-called “dual-process” 
model of information gathering and information processing has 
been around for some time,48 much of the recent visibility for 
System 1 and System 2 thinking can be attributed to Kahneman’s 
2011 publication of Thinking, Fast and Slow.  
                                                          
AND SHADOWS: SEARCHING FOR THE KEYS TO ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING 
(2009).  
44 See Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 524.  
45 Heuristics and biases are two sides of the same coin: the heuristic is an 
experience-based rule of thumb that often works well, but can also lead to 
systematic errors or cognitive biases. For more information, see generally Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
46 Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 515. 
47 One critic has argued that “there is a real distinction between intuitive 
and reflective cognitive processes,” but that many other claims about the 
differences between System 1 and System 2 are not supported. Peter Carruthers, 
The Fragmentation of Reasoning, in LA COEVOLUCIÓN DE MENTE Y LENGUAJE: 
ONTOGÉNESIS Y FILOGÉNESIS 1, 1–3 (P. Quintanilla ed., 2013). 
48 The dual-process model described information as being processed along 
a continuum from (at the heuristic end) effortless perception of information 
using rules of thumb or stereotypes to (at the systematic end) careful study of the 
information. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic 
Judgment, in HEURISTICS OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49–81 (Thomas Gilovich 
et al. eds., 2002).  
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Though much of the book highlights the inaccurate judgments 
that result from fast (or intuitive) thinking, fast thinking often is 
not only good, but also essential to our lives. Knowing that the 
green light means go without having to think about it means that 
we can safely walk across the street within the seconds allowed by 
the timed traffic signal. System 1 routinely guides our thoughts and 
actions, and we continue to follow System 1 because it often serves 
us well. On the other hand, System 1 is the source of “implicit 
bias,” the result of unconscious mental processes that affect 
perception, impressions, and judgment because of implicit 
memories, perceptions, attitudes, and stereotypes. 
Compared with System 2 thinking, System 1 thinking appears 
more related to affect or emotion: it “represents events in the form 
of concrete exemplars and schemas inductively derived from 
emotionally significant past experiences.”49 Which system kicks in 
for a particular situation depends both on the characteristics of the 
situation and the emotions affected: when the situations are the 
same, “the greater the emotional involvement, the greater the shift 
in the balance of influence from the rational [System 2] to the 
experiential system [System 1].”50  System 1’s reliance on affect 
and emotion makes it “a quicker, easier, and more efficient way to 
navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous 
world.” In addition, failing to listen to System 1 can lead decisions 
astray when they include an emotional component.51 
On the other hand, slow thinking is considered essential during 
at least some parts of the process of making more complex 
decisions. Even a relatively simple decision such as choosing 
whether to look to the right or to the left for oncoming traffic 
before walking across the street might involve System 2 thinking. 
If a pedestrian from the United States found himself in London at a 
crosswalk that did not have a sign instructing him to “look right,” 
he should reflect on the choice rather than following the intuitive 
and usually correct response—to look first to the left. According to 
                                                          
49 Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and 
Rational Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 819 (1994). 
50 Id. 
51 Paul Slovic, Affect, Reason, and Mere Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
191, 192, 201–04 (2007). 
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the heuristics and biases school of thought, application of System 2 
thinking almost always improves decision making. From this 
perspective, the quick impressions created by System 1 will control 
our judgments and decisions unless the more deliberate thinking of 
System 2 takes over to modify or override the System 1 
responses.52  
While Kahneman has “spent much of his career running 
experiments in which intuitive judgment was commonly found to 
be flawed,” Klein has spent most of his career studying expert 
decision making and “thinking about ways to promote reliance on 
expert intuition.”53 The kind of “intuition” Klein advocates is not 
the so-called gut reaction that leads to instant knowledge that 
someone is telling the truth or lying, but the flash of recognition 
that comes from a cue alerting the problem solver to an analogous 
pattern, allowing the expert to draw on past or known experiences 
to come up with parallel patterns or paths. Through his research 
involving a range of experts, Klein found that in real-life complex 
situations, experts rely on intuition to solve problems. They are 
able to solve problems not because their intuition is necessarily 
correct, but because intuition is how they identify workable options 
to test.54 
The intuitive problem-solving model that Klein describes 
blends two processes: (1) how decision makers “size up” a 
situation and thus recognize a possibly workable course of action, 
and (2) how they evaluate the course of action by simulating or 
imagining its results.55 Klein points out that this process differs 
from the rational choice model of decision making (the decision 
maker lines up the pluses and minuses of each option and decides 
                                                          
52 Id. at 201; see also Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 519. 
53 Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 515. In a 1992 article, cognitive 
psychologist James Shanteau pointed out that while “[j]udgment and decision 
research has shown that experts make flawed decisions due, in part, to the 
biasing effects of judgmental heuristics,” cognitive science research “views 
experts as competent and different from novices in nearly every aspect of 
cognitive functioning.” James Shanteau, Competence in Experts: The Role of 
Task Characteristics, 53 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 252, 252 (1992). 
54 See Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 516. 
55 KLEIN, supra note 21, at 24. 
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by weighing them) in several ways. First, rather than comparing 
options, the decision maker focuses on assessing a situation and 
finding familiar features. Second, in contrast with the more formal 
comparison implied by the rational choice model, the decision 
maker quickly evaluates possible courses of action by imagining 
how they would be carried out. Finally, rather than the best option, 
the decision maker looks for the first workable option. Because the 
decision maker often finds the first option to be workable, the 
decision maker usually generates and evaluates alternatives one at 
a time. By imagining what will happen as the first workable option 
is being carried out, the expert decision maker is able to identify 
weaknesses and make adjustments.56 
In the Klein model of intuitive problem solving, experts engage 
in both an intuitive process “that brings promising solutions to 
mind and a deliberate activity in which the . . . solution is mentally 
simulated . . . .”57 In the Kahneman model, System 2 is involved in 
careful reasoning and decision making as well as in continuous 
monitoring. For the heuristics and biases researchers, “[w]hen 
there are cues that an intuitive judgment could be wrong, System 2 
can impose a different strategy . . . .”58 To sum up, intuition opens 
minds for further thinking in the Klein approach, but intuition 
exists to be corrected in the Kahneman model. 
 
II. WHEN WE PROCESS NOVEL METAPHORS, WE MAY BE 
REQUIRED TO ENGAGE IN  MORE REFLECTIVE DECISION 
MAKING 
 
Analogy and metaphor take different linguistic forms, but they 
work in similar ways. The linguistic difference is very simply 
illustrated as follows: 
  
Analogy: A is like B (Juliet is like the sun.) 
Metaphor: A is B (Juliet is the sun.)  
 
In both instances, A is the target domain, and B is the source 
                                                          
56 Id. at 30.  
57 Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 519. 
58 Id. 
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domain. When the purpose of using an analogy or a metaphor is to 
explain, the target (A) typically is the “new” concept or the more 
abstract idea, and the source (B) is the more familiar or concrete 
thing. The analogy or the metaphor should make A more 
understandable for one of several reasons: because B is a similar, 
but more familiar or more concrete example; because B provides a 
more abstract category of examples into which A seems to fit; or 
because B helps the reader see A in a new light. The inferences 
that derive from analogy are similar to metaphorical inferences: 
“[b]oth analogy and metaphor involve a similarity relation between 
two objects, and the similarity relation transfers meaning from one 
object (the source) to another (the target).”59 
Recent analogy research suggests that the important distinction 
is not between analogy and metaphor but between conventional 
metaphor and novel metaphor.60 This distinction is elusive, in part 
because novel metaphors may over time become conventional.61 
The difference may usefully be viewed as akin to the difference 
between a poetic metaphor and a propositional metaphor.62 A 
propositional metaphor, although not literally true, suggests that 
one thing should be seen as and treated as if it were another (the 
First Amendment is a wall of separation). In contrast, poetic 
metaphor (all the world’s a stage) proposes a shift in viewpoint or 
perspective, a new take, a way of seeing that makes you consider a 
familiar concept in a new light.63  
Both conventional and novel metaphors may serve as schemas 
or embedded knowledge structures to be pulled from memory 
when needed. The use of conventional metaphors appears to 
support System 1 thinking: when you repeat a conventional 
metaphor, you are hoping that the audience will “automatically” 
                                                          
59 Dan Hunter, Teaching and Using Analogy in Law, 2 J. ALWD 151, 155 
(2004). According to Dan Hunter, the major difference is that analogy “has an 
explicit explanatory or predictive component,” and metaphor does not. Id. 
60 See Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 227–36. 
61 See id. 
62 See Linda L. Berger, Metaphor in Law as Poetic and Propositional 
Language, EUR. LEGACY: TOWARD NEW PARADIGMS [hereinafter Berger, 
Metaphor in Law] (forthcoming). 
63 See Elisabeth Camp, Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor, 
1 PHIL. COMPASS 154 (2006) [hereinafter Camp, Metaphor in the Mind]. 
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accept that the target fits into the category slot of the source. The 
processing of a novel metaphor, on the other hand, begins with the 
automatic, intuitive thinking of System 1—recognition of a 
familiar pattern or path—but the audience is then required to work 
through an alignment, comparison, and inference process that 
blends intuitive and analytical (or more reflective) thinking.64 
 
A. How Do We Process Analogies? 
 
For the analogy researchers, analogy does not work in the same 
way as a literal similarity or a category-like abstraction.65 For 
example, in the literal similarity—The X12 star system in the 
Andromeda galaxy is like our solar system—there are literal 
similarities both in the characteristics of the objects involved (the 
X12 star is yellow and mid-sized, as is our sun) and in the 
relationships among them (the planets revolve around the X12 star, 
as they do around our sun).66 But the analogy—The hydrogen atom 
is like our solar system—depends mostly on similarities in the 
structure of the relationships in the target and the source: an 
electron revolves around the nucleus like the planets revolve 
around the sun. Some characteristics of the objects may be literally 
similar, but it is irrelevant that others are not.67 Conversely, the 
abstraction—The hydrogen atom is a central force system—
depends only on similarities in relationships.68 
The idea that human cognition could be studied “as a form of 
computation” led to research into cognitive processes, including 
perception, memory, and problem solving.69 The broader study of 
analogy by cognitive scientists came later, starting in about 1980.70 
                                                          
64 See infra Part II.B.  
65 Gentner, Structure-Mapping, supra note 4, at 159–61.  
66 Id. at 159. 
67 See id. at 159–61. 
68 Id. at 160–61. 
69 K.J. Holyoak et al., Introduction: The Place of Analogy in Cognition, in 
THE ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1, 7 (Dedre 
Gentner et al. eds., 2001). 
70 Id. at 7. Analogy research has been conducted by a number of disciplines 
through a range of methods, including computer simulations, psychological 
experiments, field observation, and linguistic analysis. Id. at 10.  
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This exploration of the relationships among learning, memory, and 
reasoning grew out of the emergence of an alternative to rule-based 
reasoning that focused on the usefulness of retrieving “cases or 
analogs stored in long-term memory when deriving solutions to 
novel problems.”71 Psychologist Dedre Gentner and her colleagues 
proposed much of the current model of analogy processing.72 They 
found that (1) the similarities in analogy lie mostly within the 
relationships present in both the target and source domains rather 
than in the features of the individual objects within those domains, 
and (2) some analogical similarities depend on higher-order 
relations, or relations between relations.73 Others studying the role 
of analogy in problem solving have developed models and theories 
suggesting that multiple constraints affect our assessments of the 
effectiveness of analogy.74  
The analogy studies appear to have reached a consensus on 
some important elements of a hybrid model of analogy processing, 
the “structural alignment” model.75 This model incorporates 
alignment (between the target and the source) and projection (from 
the source to the target). According to the model, the first step in 
processing an analogy is that one or more relevant analogs (or 
schema) are accessed from long-term memory. The processor (or 
reader) then begins comparing the source and the target to identify 
matches and to align the corresponding parts of the target and the 
source. After that, the reader maps source attributes onto the target. 
The mapping allows analogical inferences derived from the source 
to transfer to the target. These inferences are evaluated and adapted 
to fit the target if necessary. In addition, new categories and 
schemas may be generated and new understandings of old schemas 
may be added to memory banks.76  
While processing an analogy, the alignment and projection (or 
mapping) may involve any or all of the following: (1) objects or 
features of the target and the source as well as the properties of 
                                                          
71 Id. at 7–8. 
72 For a summary of the study of analogy as cognitive process, see id. at 7–
10. 
73 Id. at 8. 
74 Id. at 8–9.  
75 Id. at 9. 
76 Id. at 9–10. 
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those objects or features; (2) relationships between the objects or 
features of the target and the source; and (3) higher-order 
relationships between the relationships. During the alignment 
process, as discussed above, the reader looks for similarities while 
comparing the various elements of the two situations. But there are 
constraints on analogy making, primarily constraints of 
consistency and systematicity. Not only must there be a one-to-one 
correspondence between the aligned elements in the target and the 
source, but also there must be parallel connections. In addition to 
structural consistency, alignment is guided by the principle of 
systematicity: a system connected by causal relationships is 
preferred over independent matches. Thus, the reader does not 
project inferences that are unconnected but instead only those that 
“complete the common system of relationships.”77 In other words, 
the target and the source must be comparable based on “clustered 
groups of relations which are able to explain why the system works 
as it does.”78 According to Gentner, this occurs because of “our 
tacit preference for coherence and deductive power in interpreting 
analogy.”79 
The multi-constraint theory of analogy affects the lawyer’s use 
of analogies in legal persuasion. Dan Hunter describes these as 
constraints at the surface or feature level, constraints at the 
structural or relationship level, and constraints of purpose.80 At 
least some surface-level similarity appears to be necessary between 
the features of the source and of the target. In fact, simple fact-
matching often appears to be the basis of legal arguments based on 
analogy.81 Still, surface-level similarity is only the first step in 
                                                          
77 Dedre Gentner et al., Viewing Metaphor as Analogy, in ANALOGICAL 
REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 
AND PHILOSOPHY 171, 172 (Daniel H. Helman ed., 1988).  
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 See Hunter, supra note 4, at 159–67 (relying on KEITH J. HOLYOAK & 
PAUL THAGARD, A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF ANALOGICAL PROBLEM 
SOLVING IN SIMILARITY AND ANALOGICAL REASONING 242 (Stella Vosniadou & 
Andrew Ortony eds.,1989); KEITH J. HOLYOAK & PAUL THAGARD, MENTAL 
LEAPS: ANALOGY IN CREATIVE THOUGHT (1995)). 
81 Id. at 159–60 (discussing studies demonstrating that surface-level 
similarities predict outcomes and noting that surface-level similarities may be 
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analogy: many things can be argued to be similar to one another at 
the level of surface features. The structural constraint requires a 
finding of consistent structural parallels between the target and the 
source. If the surface level describes objects, the structural level 
describes relationships between or among objects. The final 
constraint is the purpose for using the analogy, which, as Hunter 
points out, may be particularly important in using analogies for 
legal persuasion. If a particular analogy helps one side’s case more 
than another, the lawyer’s purpose will influence others’ 
perceptions of whether the analogy is good or not.82 
 
B. How Do We Process Metaphors?  
 
Like Aristotle, analogy researchers now believe that 
“comparison is the fundamental process that drives metaphor.”83 
Moreover, they conclude that “[n]ovel metaphors are understood 
only by comparison,” and even though “[c]onventional metaphors 
can be understood by accessing stored abstractions, . . . these 
metaphoric abstractions are a product of past comparisons.”84 This 
conclusion differs from other current and traditional models of 
metaphor processing.85  
For example, the model of juxtaposition suggested that 
metaphor works by contrasting the target (Juliet) with the source 
(that is, with any another object, event, or situation, like the sun). 
The juxtaposition was thought to nudge us to attend to previously 
unnoticed features of the target. This model, however, failed to 
explain how metaphors could generate new information.86 
“Category-transfer” models proposed that metaphor works by 
forming ad hoc categories, abstracting from a prototype of the 
source, and then transferring to the target. When we think of life as 
a journey, we derive abstract categories from the concrete features 
of a journey to produce a more general schema for understanding 
                                                          
sufficient when a judge must decide many cases in a short period of time).  
82 Id. at 166–67. 
83 Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 233. 
84 Id. at 234 (alteration in original). 
85 See Camp, Metaphor in the Mind, supra note 63, at 161–62.  
86 Id.  
 METAPHOR AND ANALOGY 169 
life. Category-transfer models explained why metaphor can help 
organize our understanding of an unfamiliar target, but they did not 
account for the different effects of applying the same source to 
different targets.87 In contrast to the category-transfer model, the 
“feature-matching” model aligned the source and the target and 
directly compared their features. The feature-matching model 
could not, however, explain some of metaphor’s broader 
organizational effects or how metaphors created new information.  
An emerging consensus supports the application of the 
analogy-processing model of “structural alignment” to the 
processing of metaphor.88 Dedre Gentner and her colleagues have 
studied how we process what Gentner calls “extended metaphoric 
systems,” such as argument as container, love as a journey.89 The 
basic explanation they sought was whether people “possess large-
scale conceptual metaphors” that are ready-made or whether such 
conceptual metaphors are understood because mappings are 
“constructed online,” as they are in analogy processing.90 Their 
results indicated that the online-construction, structure-mapping 
theory best explains the processing of novel metaphors: that is, 
these “metaphors are processed as structural alignments, based on 
some initial relational commonalities.”91 After that, “further 
inferences are projected from the more concrete or familiar 
[source] to target.”92 In other words, when a reader encounters a 
novel metaphor, the reader recognizes parallel features and 
structures shared by the target and the source, and then the reader 
creates new understanding by projecting inferences from the 
source to the target.93  
Gentner and her co-authors concluded that the same “basic 
                                                          
87 Id. at 162–63. 
88 Holyoak et al., supra note 69, at 9. 
89 Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 202. These 
metaphors were discussed at length in LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra 
note 2. 
90 Genter et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 206–07. 
91 Id. at 207. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 208. One difference from Lakoff’s theory is that the abstract target 
is “not structured de novo by [the] concrete [source], but rather begins with 
some structure of [its] own . . . .” Id.  
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processes of analogy are at work in metaphor . . . structural 
alignment, inference projection, progressive abstraction, and re-
representation . . . .”94 Their research suggested that as metaphors 
move from being novel to becoming conventional, the reader 
switches her mental processing of the metaphor from making a 
comparison to fitting an unknown experience into a prior 
categorization.95 As a result, according to these researchers, when 
the reader is interpreting a novel metaphor, she is engaged in 
creating meaning, but when the reader is interpreting a 
conventional metaphor, she is retrieving meaning from a mental 
storeroom.96 
We can see something of the evolution of metaphorical 
processing from comparison to categorization by examining the 
career of the now-conventional metaphor that the mind is a 
computer. When computers were new, some scientists had 
suggested the mirror-image metaphor—the computer is a brain—
as a way to describe and explain a machine that was capable of 
processing symbols, something that previously had been done only 
by human beings.97 
Later, when scientists began studying the mind as an 
information-processing mechanism, it was in part because the 
mind had become the target of the metaphor (the more abstract 
concept to be explained), and the computer now served as the more 
concrete or familiar source for transferring understanding.98 When 
this later metaphor—the  mind is a computer—was first used, it 
was novel, that is, the source domain (the computer) had not 
previously been applied to the target domain (the mind). To 
understand the metaphor, the reader had to try to align the 
characteristics and relationships existing within a computer with 
those existing within a mind: for example, both appear to take in 
                                                          
94 Id. at 243. 
95 Id. at 230. 
96 Id. at 241–42 (noting that some metaphors end up as conventionalized 
systems of reasoning). 
97 Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Mind As Computer: Birth of a 
Metaphor, 9 CREATIVITY RES. J. 131, 131, 134–35 (1996) (arguing that tools 
become theories because scientists tend to rely on analogies “between new tools 
and nature, society, or mind”). 
98 See id. at 135–43. 
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data and to process it before producing some kind of report.99 In 
the beginning of its career as a novel image, the mind is a 
computer metaphor generated not only a new way of seeing but 
also a new way of studying the mind.100 Now that the metaphor has 
become conventional, saying that the mind is a computer appears 
to state only the obvious—that  the mind fits into the category of 
an information-processing mechanism.101 
Although Gentner and her colleagues found that individual 
metaphors may evolve during their careers from alignment-based 
processing (side-by-side comparison of source and target) to 
projection-based processing (directional projection from source to 
target), their findings appear to contradict some aspects of the 
cognitive metaphor theory of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. 
Lakoff and Johnson argued that domain-level metaphors construct 
thought, primarily through one-way projection from source to 
target.102 They concluded that “metaphor shapes thought by 
mapping onto the new experience the structures, inferences, and 
reasoning methods of the old.”103 In this view, rather than drawing 
on existing similarities between the source and the target, 
metaphorical processing creates similarities by providing a source 
structure through which to view the target. Thus, when you use a 
conceptual metaphor such as justice is balancing, the reader 
invokes an already-stored conceptual mapping and applies it to 
justice.  
Lakoff and Johnson argued not only that metaphor creates 
                                                          
99 See id. at 136. 
100 Some cognitive scientists credit the analogy between information 
processing by humans and the processing that is performed by digital 
computers—the analogical insight “that cognition can be systematically 
analyzed as a form of computation”—for guiding much of the early work in 
modern cognitive science. Holyoak et al., supra note 69, at 7.  
101 Gigerenzer and Goldstein note that once computers were used in every 
psychological laboratory, “broad acceptance of the metaphor of the mind as 
computer followed.” Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supra note 97, at 143. 
102 See, e.g., LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 2, at 4. 
103 Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How 
the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. 
ALWD 169, 171 (2004) [hereinafter Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation 
Speaking?]. In my previous article, I applied Professors Lakoff and Johnson’s 
theory to legal persuasion. See id. 
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cognitive content but also that metaphor is the fundamental process 
in both thought and expression.104 They were persuaded by their 
research—much of it addressing the use of a concrete, experienced 
source domain to structure and understand a more abstract target 
domain—that metaphor is absorbed through long, constant, and 
unconscious experience. The resulting conceptual metaphors 
provide tacit knowledge that has become embedded through 
unavoidable and repeated experience.105 Some critics of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor dispute the 
overarching claim that metaphor is the fundamental feature of 
thought.106 These critics point out that metaphor is not the only 
language process that works in a similar way. Other stored 
knowledge structures—including schema, analogy, and narrative—
also create new meaning by mapping the source domain on top of 
the target or by transferring features from the source to the 
target.107 
Based on their studies of analogy and metaphor, Gentner and 
her co-authors concluded that the Lakoff and Johnson theory of 
how metaphors construct meaning might apply to conventional 
metaphors but not to novel ones.108 Specifically, rather than 
alignment and projection moving solely from the source to the 
target, Gentner and her colleagues found that understanding a 
metaphor begins with a symmetrical alignment process. Once an 
alignment is found, then further inferences are directionally 
projected from source to target. That is, directional inference 
building—from source to target—arises after the initial stage, but 
the initial stage is side-by-side.109 When we try to understand a 
novel metaphor, we structurally align concrete or literal 
representations of the source and target. As we repeat these 
                                                          
104 E.g., LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 2. 
105 See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 2, at 9–
15.  
106 See, e.g., Camp, Metaphor in the Mind, supra note 63, at 158–60. 
107 The argument that all thinking is fundamentally metaphorical may be 
undermined by studies showing that unfamiliar and novel metaphors take longer 
to process than literal sentences. Gentner et al., Metaphor Is Like Analogy, supra 
note 6, at 202, 216.  
108 Id. at 216–17. 
109 Id. at 227.  
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comparisons over time, we can abstract a more general 
metaphorical meaning, and we begin to associate the abstract 
meaning with the source term.110 Through repeated instances of 
structural alignment, we inductively create metaphoric 
categories.111  
Novel metaphors use sources that refer to specific concepts not 
yet associated with more general categories. They are interpreted 
as comparisons between features and relationships associated with 
both the literal source and the literal target. Conventional 
metaphors involve sources that refer both to a literal concept and to 
an associated metaphoric category. A novel metaphor, according to 
this research, is processed by aligning the literal senses of both 
terms, while a conventional metaphor may be interpreted either by 
aligning the target with the literal source or by aligning the target 
with the source’s abstract metaphoric category.112   
For the purposes of legal persuasion, what this suggests is that 
a reader who is asked to interpret a novel metaphor will be 
engaged in the creation of meaning, while the reader who is 
confronted with a conventional metaphor will do nothing more 
than retrieve an abstract metaphoric category. Thus, when it was a 
novel metaphor (and phrased as an analogy), processing the 
meaning of A mind is like a computer involved an active and 
reflective comparison of the source and the target. But as the 
metaphor became conventional, understanding the use of A mind is 
a computer became an automatic process of categorization. The 
application of this finding to legal persuasion is discussed in Part 
III. 
 
C. How Does Metaphor Differ from Analogy? 
 
Analogical reasoning that compares case precedents is an 
obvious example of lawyers’ use of analogy to persuade. But 
analogy has many persuasive applications beyond the use of prior 
precedents “to predict, explain or justify the outcome of the 
                                                          
110 Id. at 228.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 229–30. 
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currently undecided case.”113 The discussion so far has emphasized 
the similarities between metaphor and analogy: both are ways of 
seeing one thing as another, and both are capable of transferring 
inferences from one domain to another. But there also are 
differences relevant to those interested in legal persuasion. For 
example, Dan Hunter distinguishes between metaphor and analogy 
on the ground that analogy has an explicit predictive or 
explanatory effect.114 Overall, metaphor appears more varied, more 
ambiguous and thus more flexible, and more tied to emotion than 
analogy.  
First, there are many more kinds of metaphor than of 
analogy.115 Some metaphors appear to be based on analogical 
comparisons of relationships between aspects of the source and the 
target or on similar features or attributes. My job is a jail is an 
example of a metaphor that appears to be based on an analogical 
comparison of relationships rather than of surface features. On the 
other hand, his eyes were burning coals is an example of a 
metaphor apparently based on a comparison of features rather than 
of relationships.116 The analogy researchers have found that 
metaphors vary more in structure than do analogies, involving 
matches between features or relationships or both, and that they 
can violate the constraint of structural consistency. Metaphors also 
may include very complex blends.117 Though metaphors may be 
based on similarities between relationships or between features, 
some studies indicate that when people interpret metaphors, as 
when they interpret analogies, they tend to rely more on 
relationships than common features.118 Even though metaphor is 
often used for novel and vivid nonliteral comparisons (unlike 
analogy), the term is also applied to metaphorical systems that are 
so familiar they have become invisible. While some metaphors are 
considered “dead,” because they no longer convey any nonliteral 
meaning, others have become conventional systems of 
                                                          
113 Hunter, supra note 59, at 153. 
114 Id. at 152. 
115 Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 240.  
116 Id. at 200.  
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 241–42. 
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reasoning.119  
Second, compared with analogy, metaphor appears to be a 
more nonliteral use of language and thus more ambiguous and 
flexible. The author of a metaphor is able to advance positions 
without being held to them. When you use a metaphor, the listener 
usually understands that you have said one thing but that you likely 
have meant another (even if the listener does not understand your 
meaning). When you use an analogy, it is hard to deny that you 
have explicitly stated that the corporation is like a person and so 
you may have to provide supporting arguments to establish the 
similarities. When you use a metaphor, you can deny that you 
intended to argue for any explicit similarities: when I said the 
corporation is a person, I meant only that a person is an easier 
way to visualize an abstract entity.  
Finally, metaphor is more associated with emotion and 
expression than analogy. Although metaphors are also used to 
explain and predict, analogy is mostly confined to explanatory-
predictive contexts.120 Poetic power is rarely attributed to analogy, 
but the poetic power of metaphor is often acknowledged. This 
power is thought to arise from metaphor’s invitation to see one 
thing “as another,” providing us with a novel perspective and 
generating new information in the process. In other words, we 
don’t see Juliet “as” the sun. But something happens to our view of 
Juliet that is similar to our viewing the classical Gestalt figure in 
which, depending on your perspective, one of two different women 
seems to appear.121 The Gestalt figure always contains the 
elements of both a young woman and an old woman, and the 
elements themselves do not change. Instead, they slip and slide 
before our eyes until they click into place. Although we now see 
something we did not see before, it is not because we have 
received new information: “Rather, the difference is experiential, 
intuitive, and holistic.”122 
 
                                                          
119 Id. 
120 Id. See also Hunter, supra note 59, at 152. 
121 JEFFREY S. NEVID, PSYCHOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 120 
(4th ed. 2011). 
122 Camp, Showing, Telling, and Seeing, supra note 4, at 2.  
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III. USED FOR LEGAL PERSUASION, NOVEL CHARACTERIZATIONS 
AND METAPHORS MAY TAP INTO ALTERNATIVE SCHEMAS, 
PROMPT MORE REFLECTIVE COMPARISON, AND ACTIVATE 
OTHER PERSUASIVE KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 
 
Sometimes the automatic operation of System 1 thinking—
simply pulling a familiar pattern from memory—will resolve a 
legal problem to the client’s satisfaction. The lawyer who must 
overcome the easily accessible answers of System 1 thinking in 
order to persuade faces a more difficult task. Substantial research 
indicates that it is very difficult to overcome System 1 thinking by 
providing new information.123 Still, we all know of instances when 
the “content of our categories”—even the “content” of our 
stereotypes—has changed significantly over time.124 For example: 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the illegal 
immigration problem in America had a Chinese 
face. . . . And now, the racial meaning ascribed to 
the very same body is often “model minority.”125 
Even though the addition of new information may be able to 
reshape our embedded knowledge frameworks over time, the 
process appears unpredictable, lengthy, and incremental. Rather 
than attempting to reshape schemas and knowledge structures by 
providing new information, the cognitive research discussed here 
supports the use of novel characterizations and metaphors to 
generate alternative ways of perceiving and interpreting the 
existing information—to shift how rather than what we see. When 
lawyers construct a theory of the case, they consciously or 
intuitively use or avoid embedded knowledge structures. These 
structures scan and filter what the audience perceives, and they can 
be used to frame and channel how the reader interprets those 
perceptions. As both filter and frame, the range of available 
knowledge structures within legal persuasion likely includes (1) 
                                                          
123 See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1132 (explaining that 
additional information is rarely enough to change judgments that flow 
automatically from schema recognition). 
124 Kang, supra note 17, at 1536 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995)). 
125 Id. 
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ideographs (individual words or terms that represent a collection of 
societal values and beliefs such as liberty, equality, neutrality, 
freedom, property);126 (2) characterizations (words or phrases that 
describe easily recognized social agents within the culture and 
become the “building blocks of narratives,” including such terms 
as Boy Scouts, Founders, Liberals, Southerners);127 (3) narratives 
and myths (recognizable, structured plots that organize and make 
understandable a series of events, including, for example, the 
quest, overcoming the monster, rags to riches);128 and (4) 
metaphors and analogies (the often-concrete sources used to 
familiarize us with and help us understand new and abstract ideas, 
such as a marketplace of ideas, a sliding scale, or a balancing 
test).129 
The use of novel characterizations and metaphors is supported 
not only by the cognitive research discussed here but also by 
language experts and philosophers who have sketched the ways 
that characterizations and metaphors can prompt new ways of 
seeing.130 For example, Elisabeth Camp131 writes that new ways of 
seeing may be brought about through a process involving 
characterizations and perspectives.132 In Camp’s view, one 
characterization is used to filter, frame, or structure another.133 I 
could, for example, use my characterization of a lioness to 
                                                          
126 This list is adapted from a list of units for critical rhetorical analysis in 
Marouf Hasian Jr., The Importance of Critical Legal Rhetorics, in LEGAL 
MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA’S RHETORICAL CULTURE 1, 14 (2000). 
See also Michael Calvin McGee, The “Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric 
and Ideology, 66 Q. J. SPEECH 1, 6–7 (1980). 
127 Hasian, supra note 126, at 14–15. 
128 Id. at 15. 
129 Hasian does not include metaphor and analogy in his list. See id. at 14–
15. 
130 This part draws on Berger, Metaphor in Law, supra note 62.   
131 Camp is a philosophy professor who writes that her interests lie “in the 
overlap between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.” See 
Elisabeth Camp, UNIV. OF PA., http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~campe/ (last modified 
Mar. 21, 2011). 
132 See Elisabeth Camp, Saying and Seeing-as: The Linguistic Uses and 
Cognitive Effects of Metaphor (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California Berkeley) (on file with author). 
133 Id. 
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structure my characterization of Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. 
Senator and Secretary of State. This process would begin with the 
most prominent and central features in the framing characterization 
(the lioness), seek matches for them within the subject 
characterization (Clinton), and then highlight the prominence and 
centrality of the matched features. Restructuring one 
characterization in light of another brings an intuitive result: if it 
works, you will come to “see” Clinton as a lioness without 
knowing how your insight came about. According to Camp, 
metaphorical perspectives have the same effect, but they are more 
general and not tied to a particular subject: “a perspective provides 
an intuitive, holistic principle for organizing our thoughts about 
some topic.”134 It does so “by imposing a complex structure of 
relative prominence on them, so that some features stick out in our 
minds while others fade into the background, and by making some 
features especially central to explaining others.”135 For instance, a 
perspective might be a political orientation or a general worldview 
that individuals are responsible for helping themselves. Like a 
characterization, a perspective may carry attitudes, emotions, and 
values. Rather than a complete, complex thought, a perspective 
provides a tool for thinking that “helps us to do things with the 
thoughts we have: to make quick judgments based on what’s most 
important, to grasp intuitive connections, and to respond 
emotionally.”136 Perspective also “provides us with a ‘way to go 
on,’ incorporating new thoughts about the focal topic and often 
about related topics as well.”137 
According to Camp, the process of metaphorically “seeing as” 
is not a what but a how. Rather than changing what exists, “[i]t 
imaginatively alters how we structure and color our thoughts about 
what is so.”138 Seeing a target through a characterization requires 
the viewer to re-structure her thinking to make the relevant features 
play an appropriately prominent or central role. Trying on a 
perspective requires the viewer to re-configure her patterns of 
                                                          
134 Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination, supra note 1, at 110–11.  
135 Id. at 111.  
136 Id. (alteration in original). 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 116. 
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thought about a broader collection of topics.139 
 
A. Using Novel Characterizations to Tap into Alternative 
Schemas and Complicate Group Stereotypes 
 
Like other unconscious uses of schematic cognition, 
stereotyping helps us manage information overload. Stereotypes 
are nothing more than “schemas for groups of people.”140 Because 
we cannot process and interpret all the data we perceive about each 
individual, stereotypes allow us to efficiently (if inaccurately) 
identify the person we have encountered, make assumptions and 
predictions about that person, and plan our own behavior in 
response. Stereotyping illustrates that schematic thinking is usually 
unconscious and difficult to control, and that social and cultural 
forces are very much involved when we construct these embedded 
knowledge structures.  
 Both explicit and indirect approaches have been suggested as 
ways to “neutralize” or counter the effects of schema or 
stereotypes associated with individuals who might be perceived as 
members of disfavored groups. When a group stereotype is 
expected to have negative effects on the person being represented, 
an attorney might point out the shortcomings of the categorization 
and explicitly argue for more individually appropriate 
characterizations.141 More indirect arguments may affect the 
emotions or self-images of audience members or may prime an 
audience with ideals of fairness and equality.142 
The cognitive research discussed in this Article suggests 
                                                          
139 Id. at 111–16. 
140 Kaye, supra note 13, at 593. They are “expectancies about a social 
group,” and they include “beliefs about the probability that particular traits, 
features, characteristics, opinions, and behaviors will be observed in those 
people at some point during our (or someone else’s) future interaction with 
them.” Id. (citing KUNDA, supra note 22, at 314–15; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 
22, at 439). 
141 See Pamela Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of 
Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. 
REV. 305, 331–32 (2012) (cataloging a number of suggestions for neutralizing 
or countering implicit bias).  
142 Id. 
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another approach: use of a novel characterization or metaphor—
one that already exists but has not previously been associated with 
this target—to shift the decision maker’s perspective. Within any 
decision-making context, multiple and various schemas might be 
triggered. Which of the possible schemas is selected to “actively 
influence [an] interaction depend[s] on numerous variables, such 
as primacy (what gets activated first), salience (which schemas 
catch attention), accessibility (which schema cues can be retrieved 
in memory easily, perhaps because of recent primacy), and 
individuating information.”143 
In a recent article, Professor Pam Wilkins illustrated the use of 
novel characterizations and metaphors to counter role stereotypes 
affecting death-penalty defendants.144 As she noted, criminal 
prosecutions often hinge on a master narrative that centers on the 
stock character of the violent criminal. In this narrative, 
“individual lawbreakers are seen as the primary or exclusive causal 
locus of criminal behavior; they alone are responsible for their 
actions and, collectively, for the overall magnitude of the ‘crime 
problem.’”145 The law-breaker is viewed as making “entirely free 
choices” and making them “willfully and selfishly . . . despite the 
perpetrators’ full knowledge of their hurtful consequences.” As a 
result, the criminal’s behavior is “a reflection of the inherent 
‘badness’ of those who engage in it.”146  
Confronted with this stock character, criminal defense 
attorneys often try to open up the lens or extend the timeline to 
look at the defendant’s life story beyond the defendant’s criminal 
acts. But at least some mitigation testimony may be harmful: 
“traditional mitigation narratives about defendants’ dysfunctional 
family lives may reinforce jurors’ racial prejudices, undermine 
defense attempts to create juror empathy for capital defendants 
who happen to be black, and ultimately increase the likelihood of 
death sentences against such defendants.”147 The schema that white 
                                                          
143 Kang, supra note 17, at 1502.  
144 Wilkins, supra note 141, at 349–58. 
145 Id. at 336. 
146 Id. at 336 (quoting Craig Haney, On Mitigation as Counter-Narrative: A 
Case Study of the Hidden Context of Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911, 
914 (2009)). 
147 Id. at 346 (citing Alycee Lane, “Hang Them if They Have to Be Hung”: 
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jurors construct for the “black family” may include expectations of 
poverty, abuse, neglect, and other pathology. If that schema is 
already in the jurors’ heads, then the defendant’s life in such an 
environment does not help the jury to understand the trouble at the 
story’s core: it’s just another stock script.148 
Professor Wilkins offers examples of different means for 
countering implicit biases, drawing on the opening and closing 
statements during the penalty phase of the trial of Alan Quinones 
after he had been convicted of racketeering, drug trafficking, and 
the murder of a confidential informant.149 The evidence suggested 
that Quinones was a “relatively large scale dealer of cocaine and 
heroin” and that Quinones had spent some time looking for the 
informant and threatening to kill him.150 According to Professor 
Wilkins, the defense attorney was able to counter the violent 
criminal schemas in play by (1) his use of an initial metaphor 
(child of God) to “prime” the jurors to consider fairness and 
equity;151 (2) his presentation of Quinones as a counter-
stereotypical exemplar;152 and (3) his invocation of competing role 
schemas, depicting Quinones as a protective father figure and a 
first-generation immigrant.153  
The lawyer’s use of the father-and-protector schema is an 
example of a novel characterization. That is, the father-and-
protector schema already exists, but it is not typically applied to 
violent criminals. The metaphor-processing research discussed 
earlier suggests that when confronted with this novel 
characterization, a juror might try to match up the characteristics of 
the defendant with the characteristics of a protective father. If the 
juror finds initial matches in literal similarities between the 
features of the defendant and those of a protective father, other 
favorable characteristics of the protective father might transfer as 
well. In other words, the defendant would benefit from helpful 
                                                          
Mitigation Discourse, Black Families, and Racial Stereotypes, 12 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 171, 188–92 (2009)). 
148 Id. at 347–48. 
149 Id. at 349–58. 
150 Id. at 350. 
151 Id. at 351–52. 
152 Id. at 352–53. 
153 Id. at 353–58. 
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inferences provided by the protective-father schema. The 
protective-father schema adds to the juror’s perspective of the 
defendant the knowledge that protective fathers will use whatever 
methods they have available.154 Within this schema, even unlawful 
activity may be seen as understandable and deserving of respect.155  
As already noted, in this example, the novel characterization is 
used to provide the decision maker with a new perspective (rather 
than with new information). By encouraging the decision maker to 
look beyond the most immediately accessible framework to 
knowledge that might be derived from alternative schemas, the 
novel characterization is designed to shift or broaden the decision 
maker’s view of the same information.  
 
B. Using Novel Metaphors to Prompt More Reflective 
Comparison and Counteract Automatic Categorization 
 
The use of a conventional metaphor is thought to impose the 
structure of the source onto the target. Once the target has been fit 
into the appropriate metaphorical category, mapping focuses a 
spotlight on some aspects of a concept, reflects other aspects, and 
eclipses still others.156 Metaphor carries over from the source to the 
target attributes, inferences, frameworks, reasoning methods, and 
evaluation standards.157  
In the following example, drawn from the briefs filed in Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky,158 the conventional metaphor is the corporation is a 
person. This metaphor has become so conventional that it goes 
unnoticed. For example, Justice Stevens automatically referred to 
the corporation being sued as having human qualities: Nike was 
besieged with allegations; Nike was participating in a public 
                                                          
154 Id. at 356–57. 
155 Id. at 357. 
156 For the metaphor-as-interaction perspective that an entire system of 
features and relationships associated with the source is used to filter or screen or 
organize our conception or perspective of some other system, see BLACK, supra 
note 31, at 39–45. 
157 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 2, at 33. The use of 
metaphor can help the writer persuade the reader to “make the leap” and to do it 
“in such a way as to make it seem graceful, compelling, even obvious.” Id.  
158 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
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debate about Nike as a good corporate citizen.159 Based on the 
analogy research cited earlier, this reference indicates that the 
metaphor was automatically and unconsciously processed and that 
the entity of the corporation was simply fit into the category of 
persons, with all the ensuing implications. 
In the lawsuit originally filed as Kasky v. Nike, a critic of 
Nike’s labor practices in foreign countries sued Nike under 
California statutes that allow private lawsuits to enforce 
prohibitions against false advertising and unfair competition.160 
Plaintiff Marc Kasky alleged that “Nike, for the purpose of 
inducing consumers to buy its products, made false representations 
of fact about the conditions under which they are made.”161 Nike 
responded that the First Amendment protected Nike’s 
communications because they were part of a debate about a public 
issue.162 The lower courts agreed and dismissed the lawsuit, but the 
California Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that Nike’s 
representations were commercial speech and thus subject to 
regulation.163 After the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
thirty-four briefs (including thirty-one amicus briefs) were filed 
and oral arguments were heard. A few months later, the Court 
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.164 In a subsequent 
settlement, Nike agreed to pay $1.5 million to a consumer 
advocacy group.165 
In the briefs they filed, both sides in the dispute assumed that 
Nike was the kind of speaker whose representations might be 
protected by the First Amendment. Nike and its supporters 
projected as the governing image of the lawsuit an attempt by the 
plaintiff to hobble one speaker in a public debate: the briefs even 
raised concerns that Nike would be placed on an unequal footing 
                                                          
159 Id. at 656–57 (Stevens, J., concurring in order dismissing cert). 
160 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. §§ 17200, 17500 (West 2012). 
161 Brief for Respondent at 1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) 
(No. 02-575), 2003 WL 1844849. 
162 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 301 (2002).  
163 Id. at 300. 
164 Kasky, 539 U.S. at 657. 
165 Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Lawsuit over Labor Claims: The Company Will 
Pay $1.5 Million in a Case that Used California Law to Contest the Firm’s 
Statements, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at C1. 
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with its critics. Nike’s personhood was used to obscure any 
distinction between the corporation and any other speaker.166 
The attorneys representing Kasky did not try to displace the 
corporation-is-a-person metaphor. That acceptance seemingly 
made it difficult to argue that Nike was distinguishable from other 
competitors in the marketplace of ideas or other participants in a 
debate.167 Through its use of a novel metaphor, the plaintiff might 
have paved the way for an argument that the advertising and public 
relations products that Nike manufactures, distributes, and sells are 
not speech at all. For example, one amicus brief set out the novel 
characterization (that is, a familiar characterization, but one that 
was new in this context) that Nike should be viewed as a 
manufacturer of products even when the product is speech. These 
amicus brief lawyers suggested that Nike’s corporate public 
relations products should be seen “as” manufactured images, 
marketing tools, and cultivated commodities. Rather than Nike 
being engaged in speech, this brief described Nike as “engaged in a 
publicity campaign.”168 The brief continued to use metaphors from 
activities other than speaking: “Nike Has Manufactured An Image 
of Social Responsibility As A Means of Promoting Product Sales”; 
“Image Promotion Is An Essential Aspect Of Product Promotion”; 
and “Nike Has Cultivated A Corporate Image Of Social 
Progressivity As A Marketing Tool To Promote Product Sales.”169 
According to the analogy research, the use of this novel 
metaphor might lead to more reflective decision making (rather 
than more automatic categorization). That is, if the audience is able 
to align the characteristics and relationships associated with 
manufacturers and products with those associated with Nike and its 
public relations campaign, the audience might also project 
inferences from manufacturing to public relations. Once Nike’s 
representations are viewed as cars or shoes, the projected 
                                                          
166 See Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking?, supra note 
103, at 192–96 (describing briefs depicting Nike “as” other protected speakers, 
including the founding fathers, the NAACP, and labor union organizers). 
167 See id. at 195–96 for a discussion of briefs depicting Nike as a 
participant in a public debate.  
168 Brief of Amici Curiae the States of California et al. at 2, Nike, Inc., v. 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 1844750.  
169 Id. at 5–9.  
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inferences suggest that they can be seen “as” part of a process that 
involves no First Amendment values at all. Instead, the public 
relations products that Nike manufactures and disseminates are like 
any other product the corporation makes. Like any other product, 
these products are made by corporate employees who are 
responding to corporate designs and directions; the content of the 
product is influenced not by self-expression or enhancement of 
knowledge but instead by sales potential. Therefore, like any other 
product, their manufacture, distribution, and sale should be subject 
to state regulation to protect the public.170  
In this example, the novel metaphor (Nike’s representations are 
products) is used to prompt more reflective thinking in an effort to 
counter the automatic process of categorization (Nike is a person). 
Thus, the novel metaphor is designed to persuade the decision 
maker to more actively compare the features and relationships of 
the source and target domains, leading to a more desirable 
persuasive outcome. 
 
C. Using a Novel Characterization to Activate the More 
Persuasive Knowledge Structure Provided by a Master 
Story171   
 
In addition to prompting an audience to consider the 
perspective of an alternative schema or to engage in more 
reflective comparison, novel characterizations and metaphors may 
be used to activate related knowledge structures. In the following 
example, the Supreme Court’s use of a novel characterization 
activated the persuasive master story provided by a canonical 
opinion, Brown v. Board of Education.172 
                                                          
170 Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking?, supra note 103, 
at 206.  
171 See Michael Goldberg, Against Acting “Humanely,” 58 MERCER L. 
REV. 899, 905 (2007). Goldberg uses the term “master story” for stories that 
“serve as the template for understanding the world and as the tutor for acting in 
it.” Id. 
172 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions of Law, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 1095 (2005) for a discussion of what he calls the “constitutional 
iconography” of cases such as Brown. See also Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board 
of Education: A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
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Applied to human beings, the label “illegal” is a destructive 
characterization that results in people being “seen as” a status they 
acquired at one moment in time.173 In Plyler v. Doe174 and a 
companion case, In re Alien Children Education Litigation,175 the 
U.S. Supreme Court for the first time explicitly ruled that 
unauthorized immigrants were entitled to equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.176 In both cases, the plaintiffs 
challenged a Texas statute that allowed the state to withhold its 
funds for the education of children who were unauthorized 
immigrants. The Texas Legislature had enacted Section 21.031 of 
its Education Code in 1975, allowing the state to withhold any 
state funds for the education of children who were not “legally 
admitted” into the United States and authorizing local school 
districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children not 
“legally admitted” into the country.177  
When the cases were decided in the Supreme Court, a 5-4 
majority found that undocumented immigrants and their children 
were “persons within the jurisdiction of the state” and thus entitled 
                                                          
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE 
AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 31, 31–62 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 
2005). 
173 See Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and 
the Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 169–70 (2012) 
(noting that government programs and policies continue to make illegality “the 
dominant characteristic that defines millions of undocumented immigrants”). 
This single “snapshot in time” event becomes a permanent image that overrides 
the many other characteristics of the humans included within the group. Id. 
174 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), began as Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 
569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff’d 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).  
175 In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 
1980). The second case was summarily affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit. 
176 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (“[T]he protection of the Fourteenth Amendment 
extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State. . . . 
That a person’s initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful . 
. . cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State’s territorial 
perimeter.”). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 2037 (2008) (examining the significance of the meaning of 
unlawful presence in Plyler). 
177 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 
Supp. 1981)). 
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to equal protection through the Fourteenth Amendment.178 Further, 
the Court held that Texas could not “deny to undocumented 
school-age children the free public education that it provides to 
children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted 
aliens.”179  
In its briefs, Texas argued that the only justification the state 
needed for the statute was the characterization that the plaintiff 
children were themselves “illegal.”180 According to the Texas 
briefs, all children of school age must fall into one of only two 
categories, legal or illegal, and the State had a responsibility to 
conserve its resources for the education of “legal” children.181 
After arguing that the equal protection clause did not apply to 
“illegal” immigrants at all, Texas went on to try to justify the 
statute on the basis of two rationales: the need to preserve scarce 
resources for the education of legal children and the need to 
discourage illegal immigration.182 The dissenting opinion in the 
Supreme Court agreed with Texas that the distinction between 
“illegal” and “legal” children was dispositive: it was a legitimate 
ground in itself for determining whose education was funded and 
whose was not.183  
For the majority, the critical point was the factual finding that 
many of the affected children would become permanent residents 
of the United States.184 As the trial court put it, “the illegal alien of 
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today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow.”185 Without an 
education, the affected children “[a]lready disadvantaged as a 
result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable 
racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked into the 
lowest socio-economic class.”186 For the majority, the problem 
with the statute was captured in this conclusion: allowing the 
statute to be enforced would lead to a “permanent caste of 
undocumented resident aliens.”187 The Court’s solution 
incorporated a novel characterization—that the plaintiff children, 
despite their lack of documents, are permanent residents—and 
triggered a master story—that education allows all Americans to 
pursue equality and avoid a caste system. 
Before establishing the novel characterization, the majority 
criticized government policies and programs that had resulted in 
the “creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of illegal 
migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.”188 But 
the problem with the Texas statute was not that so many lived in 
the shadows; instead, it was that the few immigrants affected by 
this statute—families with children—were likely to remain 
permanently within the United States. If they did remain 
permanently, and if they also remained uneducated, the Texas 
policy would “raise[] the specter of a permanent caste of 
undocumented resident aliens,” with the plaintiff children being 
especially innocent members of this underclass.189  
This characterization of immigrant children as permanent 
residents—no matter what their citizenship status—served as a 
prime or stimulus for another schema, one that amounted to a 
master story: the story of Brown v. Board of Education.190 The 
decision in Brown, said the majority opinion, symbolized the core 
purpose of the equal protection clause: to abolish “governmental 
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barriers . . . to advancement on the basis of individual merit.”191 
Moreover, Brown underscored that education is critical to 
becoming American (“required in the performance of our most 
basic public responsibilities [and] the very foundation of good 
citizenship”) and to having an equal chance of success as an 
American.192 Justice Brennan relied as well on the Brown Court’s 
conclusion that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”193 Because many of the children “disabled” by being 
labeled illegal will remain in the United States, and “some will 
become lawful residents or citizens,” Justice Brennan wrote for the 
majority that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the State 
hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a 
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the 
problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”194 
If the characterization of the children as permanent residents 
works in the same way as a novel metaphor, it may be able to shift 
the audience’s perspective from the conventional categorization 
that Texas advanced: that immigrants must be either legal or 
illegal. The permanent resident characterization provides an 
alternative and possibly relevant analog or schema to be accessed 
from memory. If the reader can identify matches between the 
characteristics and relationships of the source, permanent resident, 
and those of the target, immigrant children, she may be able to 
align the target with the source. Then, inferences derived from the 
source may be transferred to the target, creating new information 
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that helps fill in the blanks or connect the dots.195  
The briefs and opinions illustrated that immigrant children 
might be “seen as” illegal or they might be “seen as” permanent 
residents. By encouraging the reader to view the children through 
the schema for permanent residents, Justice Brennan was able to 
cast the children as characters in the story of how equal access to 
education will transform America into a land of equal opportunity.  
In contrast to this use of a novel characterization, the interplay 
of larger perspectives with conventional metaphorical categories 
may be seen in another immigration decision196 30 years later. In 
that decision, the Supreme Court upheld federal power to regulate 
immigration and struck down major portions of an Arizona statute 
that had been called the nation’s toughest law on immigration 
when it was enacted in 2010.197 In his opinion for the majority, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy described the United States as a nation 
of immigrants and characterized the power of the “Government of 
the United States” with regard to immigration as “broad [and] 
undoubted,” resting not only on the Constitution but also on the 
inherent power of a national sovereign to conduct relations with 
foreign nations.198 He depicted a national government that 
exercises its significant power with restraint and discretion. This 
characterization of the national government, its power to conduct 
relations with foreign nations, and its restraint is the lens through 
which Arizona’s law may be seen as undermining federal law. 
From a larger perspective, Justice Kennedy viewed the United 
States as a member of the international community of nations.199 
Considering these characterizations and this perspective, an 
audience might re-align its patterns of thought even if Justice 
Kennedy did not explicitly state the proposition that only the 
national sovereign should control and conduct relations with 
foreign nations.  
In contrast, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
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part, Justice Antonin Scalia proposed the conventional metaphor 
that “[t]he United States is an indivisible ‘Union of sovereign 
States.’”200 And he wrote that the majority opinion deprived the 
states “of what most would consider the defining characteristic of 
sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory 
people who have no right to be there.”201 These conventional 
metaphors and characterizations accord prominence and centrality 
to the sovereign character of the states, and they make the central 
feature of sovereignty the power “to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners . . . .”202 If Justice Scalia’s characterizations and 
metaphors work in the way that the research suggests for 
processing of conventional metaphors, the reader will 
automatically categorize Arizona’s legislation as warranted. 
To sum up, these immigration examples illustrate how novel 
characterizations and conventional metaphors may be used to 
achieve different goals in legal persuasion. The novel 
characterization (immigrant children as permanent residents) 
allowed the author to construct a bridge to a persuasive master 
story (equal access to education is necessary for equal opportunity 
to succeed) while the conventional metaphor (immigrant children 
as illegal) provided a category for automatic disposition without 
further reflection. Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s international 
community perspective may prompt the reader to more deliberately 





Better understanding of the thinking and decision-making 
processes of judges and juries should help lawyers make more 
informed and deliberate choices about persuasion.203 Recent 
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research may help lawyers take advantage of the insight that the 
same schematic cognition process that leads us to assign negative 
characteristics to stereotypes may also allow us to see a violent 
criminal as a protective father or an illegal immigrant as a 
permanent resident.204  
This Article suggests that lawyers should turn to novel 
characterizations and metaphors to address one of the persuasion 
problems created by the confluence of System 1 and System 2 
thinking. Many cognitive scientists agree that our perception and 
interpretation follow the process described as schematic cognition: 
in other words, we analogize new information we encounter to 
schemas and knowledge structures embedded in memory. The 
decision-making research also is in agreement about some things: 
in System 1 decision making, only the most accessible knowledge 
structures are active, and the answer to how to think about and 
what to do with the new information is automatic and intuitive. 
Adding current analogy research to the mix suggests that novel 
metaphors and characterizations may be used to prompt a decision 
maker’s intuition to activate various schemas or knowledge 
structures beyond those that are immediately accessible.205 The 
resulting online processing of the novel metaphor or 
characterization resembles the more reflective decision making of 
System 2. In situations where the immediately accessible schema 
yields an unfavorable answer, prompting the decision maker to 
take the more reflective route opens the way to a potentially 
persuasive result. 
Recommending novel metaphors and characterizations is not 
the same thing as recommending that more information be 
provided to counter negative stereotypes and expand conventional 
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categories: the shift being sought through a novel metaphor or 
characterization is not a change in what the audience perceives but 
in how the audience sees and interprets it. After their review of 
schema theory, authors Chen and Hanson concluded that three 
conditions must coincide to nudge an audience away from its 
tendency to automatically and unconsciously adopt the most 
available or active schema or category: “Only when the evidence 
available to us is (1) relevant and (2) inconsistent with our schema, 
and only when (3) we are otherwise not too cognitively busy, is 
there any potential that our schemas and their biasing effects will 
be challenged.”206  
Yet these authors find room for persuasion within the social 
cognition research. In many circumstances, they say, audience 
members show some flexibility in choosing among schemas, a 
flexibility that can be affected “by factors such as language, 
primacy, salience, and priming.”207 The use of analogies and 
metaphors may help an audience activate and analyze some 
categories and schemas rather than others.208 The use of novel 
characterizations and metaphors may be an effective way to 
suggest to decision makers that individuals and circumstances 
often fit into more than one framework and that they should more 
fully consider a more complicated reality.  
As language theorists have written, there may be more 
effective “ways of changing someone’s mind than changing his or 
her beliefs.”209 When we are engaged in legal persuasion, what we 
are after is not so much different beliefs, but “changes in the 
associations and comparisons one makes, differences in the vivid 
or ‘felt’ appreciation of something already known, or changes in 
one’s habits of attention and sense of the important and the 
trifling.”210 Such changes and differences may fall within the 
power of novel metaphors and characterizations.211  
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